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ABSTRACT 
The political significance of women's lobbying efforts to affect the wording of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is assessed in this paper. The author 
proposes that the women's lobby worked within government defined terms of reference, and its success was limited to strengthening the federal 
government's commitment to legal equality rights for women. In the process, the Ad Hoc Committee which led the lobby modeled its tactics on those of 
traditional pressure groups, and not on the consensual tactics of many feminist groups. 
RESUME 
Dans cette communication, I'auteur examine l'imponance politique des efforts des groupes feministes exercant des pressionsafin d'obtenir des droits 
pour les femmes a l'interieurde la Chartedes Droits et Liberie. Ces groupes ontaccepte leslimites etablies par legouvernement federal. Leursucces etait 
de consolider les droits d'egalitedeja accepte par legouvernement federal. Presentementa developper les tactiques, leComitead hoc sur la Constitution 
a adopte des tactiques traditionnels plutot que les tactiques feministes. 
Introduction 
On April 17, 1985, the equality rights section of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into effect. Two 
sections of the Charter specifically pertain to women's 
rights, and women's groups were influential in affecting 
their final form. Section 15 guarantees every individual 
equality "before and under the law without discrimina-
tion based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, reli-
gion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability." Section 28 
guarantees that "Notwithstanding anything in this Char-
ter, the rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed 
equally to male and female persons."1 Section 28, unlike 
section 15, is not subject to provincial override. The legal 
significance of the Charter for the advancement of women's 
rights both provincially and federally may be substantial. 
That possibility has been explored by others2 and will 
continue to be of interest as equality cases are brought 
before the Supreme Courts of the provinces and of Can-
ada. This paper focuses on the political significance of 
women's success in affecting the wording of the Charter. 
In 1982 when the Constitution was proclaimed, most of 
the people involved in the process were euphoric about 
what they saw as women's new-found political clout. 
Rosemary Billings, one of the members of the group 
actively fighting for women's rights in the Charter, later 
proposed that her group "got the state to do something 
which was against its own best interest."5 Penney Rome, 
who wrote a stirring account of the women's lobby, des-
cribed women's success as "a political earthquake." In her 
words: 
Organized women wrote a sexual equality clause 
into the new Canadian Constitution over opposi-
tion from the federal government and defended it 
against revision by the provincial governments.4 
Walter McLean, opposition critic for women's issues at 
the time and in 1984 appointed the Minister Responsible 
for the Status of Women, proposed that "the constitu-
tional lobby was a watershed period for the Canadian 
women's movement, establishing it as a major political 
force."5 Clearly, there was a strong feeling that the Charter 
experience was both a political and a legal victory for 
women's groups. Several years after the event, it seems 
appropriate to look back on the interaction which took 
place between women's groups and the two levels of govern-
ment to assess the nature of the victory. The lessons 
learned from the Charter experience can be important for 
the development of future strategies for women's groups 
as they continue to press governments for changes. 
The Constitution Experience in Review 
For the purpose of this paper, the constitution issue is 
limited to the period between 1978 and 1982. There were 
many discussions of amending formulae and changes in 
the distribution of federal-provincial powers before that 
time, but 1978 marked the formal beginning of the federal 
government's emphasis on a human rights charter for 
Canadians in the new constitution package. In terms of 
understanding the outcome of this issue it is significant 
that in 1978 the federal government began to talk about the 
constitution as a symbolic issue. In that year, with the 
publication of the white paper, A Time for Action, the 
federal government shifted its emphasis on constitutional 
renewal from a redistribution of federal-provincial powers 
to equality rights for Canadians. The proposed charter 
was described in symbolic terms as part of a new begin-
ning for Canada: 
Over the course of their history, Canadians have 
developed their own identity, their own conception 
of government and society and their own world 
perspective. The principles of the renewal proposed 
by the government must be based on this identity, 
this conception and this perspective.6 
In the white paper, the government proposed a rights 
package which included protection for native people; the 
development of French and English; the enhancement of 
the mosaic of cultures; the self-development of the regions; 
economic integration; national stability; and the interde-
pendence of the federal and provincial governments. The 
package did not include equality rights for women and 
men. This failure to include women was surprising given 
the earlier commitment, albeit fairly ineffectual, to the 
equal treatment of men and women before the law in the 
1960 Bill of Rights.7 Indeed, the Bill of Rights served as a 
model for parts of the proposed Charter. It was surprising 
as well in view of the Liberal government's attempts, since 
1970, to remove the discriminatory treatment of women 
from some of its laws.8 
However, later in 1978 when the government intro-
duced its first Constitution Bill in the House of Commons, 
sex had been added to the list of equality provisions. 
Section 9 of this Bill states that: 
The rights and freedoms declared by sections 6, 7, 
and 8 of this Charter shall be enjoyed without dis-
crimination because of race, national or ethnic 
origin, language, colour, religion, age, or sex.9 
The rights protected were freedom of thought, con-
science, religion, opinion, expression, peaceful assembly 
and association, press, opinion and belief, the right to life, 
liberty, and security of the person, rights against unreaso-
nable arrest and searches, and the right to mobility across 
provinces in Canada. It was a document written in the 
liberal tradition, and focused on the rights of individuals. 
The decision by the government to include equality provi-
sions for women in the 1978 Bill was significant politi-
cally, for it meant that the principle of equality rights for 
women and men, while possibly not of great importance 
to the government, was nonetheless acceptable almost 
from the outset of the Charter issue. 
The federal Liberal government was not successful in 
its bid to convince the provinces to accept the 1978 Bill 
which was defeated in 1979. The Liberals, led by Prime 
Minister Trudeau, were returned to power in February 
1980, and early in October they placed a new bill before the 
House of Commons which called for unilateral federal 
action to patriate the constitution. The 1980 Bill looked 
very much like the earlier 1978 version. In the 1980 docu-
ment, equality rights could be found in Section 15, which 
stated that: 
Everyone has the right to equality before the law and 
to the equal protection of the law without discrimi-
nation because of race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, age, or sex.10 
The list of rights protected was similar to that contained in 
the 1978 Bill. In addition, the 1980 Bill included the pro-
viso that the equality rights provisions did not preclude 
affirmative action in favour of disadvantaged persons or 
groups. This was one more indication of the federal 
government's commitment to equal opportunity. 
At this point, women's groups began to take an active 
interest in the constitution proceedings. They were spurred 
to action by two events. The first of these was the decision 
by the federal government to transfer jurisdiction over 
divorce to the provinces. Women's groups were concerned 
that this would make it even more difficult for women to 
obtain support payments from their former husbands, and 
they made a strong appeal to the federal government to 
leave divorce in federal hands. While the government 
agreed to this demand, suddenly the question of federal-
provincial powers was seen to be relevant for women's 
lives. The second concern of women's groups was that the 
constitution was to be a blueprint for the future of Canada. 
They heard the words "principles for renewal" in the 
deliberations and wanted to make sure that women were 
part of that renewal. 
During the constitutional talks there were about 20 
national women's groups in existence. The most impor-
tant of these was the National Action Committee on the 
Status of Women (NAC), an umbrella organization com-
mitted to what it calls feminist goals; i.e., attempts to bring 
about "self-determination for women in political, eco-
nomic , and social roles."11 From the beginning, the 
National Action Committee was the women's group most 
actively involved. However, two factors restricted its role. 
First, while the principle of equality for women and men 
was never questioned by the group, the notion of an 
entrenched charter and the process by which it should be 
obtained were debated among the executive and the mem-
bership. Secondly, the group discovered that it could not 
obtain funds to carry out its goal of keeping women 
informed and providing them with a forum for discussion 
of a new constitution. The National Action Committee 
receives most of its funds from the federal government, 
through the Secretary of State. For example, in 1982, 
$175,000 of its budget came from the Secretary of State, and 
only $4,000 from members' dues.12 In 1980 the National 
Action Committee established a Constitution Committee, 
which made plans for regional meetings to discuss the 
issue. It applied too late for government funding for the 
meetings, and they were not held. 
As a result, the National Action Committee could not 
carry out its role as a leading lobby group on this issue. 
The Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women 
filled the leadership vacuum. Papers on the constitution 
proposals were prepared for the Council, and were made 
available to interested persons or groups. Doris Anderson, 
who was then President of the Advisory Council, explained 
her Council's involvement this way: 
NAC wasn't as geared up as it should have been to 
run with that kind of an issue as a lobby group. And 
so, much more cumbersome and less well-equipped 
an organization like the Advisory Council took on 
the job of trying to alert women to the implications 
of the wording of the Charter...15 
But the Council had been appointed by the federal 
government, and while its mandate was to advise the 
government on status of women's issues, some of its mem-
bers felt bound by government directives. This restricted 
the Council's freedom to act. Its assumption of leadership 
on this issue led to serious problems as the government 
and women's groups began to disagree on what equality 
rights for women involved. 
The problems associated with relying on a government 
appointed agency for leadership on an issue became par-
ticu larly clear when the Advisory Council began to organ-
ize a national conference on the Constitution to be held in 
Ottawa in September, 1980, one week prior to the First 
Ministers' Conference on the constitution. The timing 
was crucial, for the Advisory Council conference would 
have given Canadian women the opportunity to express 
their views on the proposals which would be discussed by 
the Premiers, before they had taken a decision. However, 
the Advisory Council conference did not take place. A 
translator's strike, in which women translators were bar-
gaining for daycare and maternity leave, led Doris Ander-
son to cancel the conference, on the grounds that women 
could not cross picket lines set up by other women. This 
was the first message to women's groups that representa-
tive democracy might not be working as well as they had 
hoped. Subsequently, the Advisory Council rescheduled 
its conference to February 14, 1981. 
In the meantime, women's groups carried on with their 
analysis. There was a growing sense among some of the 
activists within women's groups that "Unless something 
was done with what was on the table there was no chance 
of getting anything at all."14 At the same time, there was 
evidence of a rift in movement politics, with Quebecois 
women opposed to the Charter altogether, and Western 
women opposed to the federal government's leadership on 
the issue. The rift resulted in the departure of the Quebe-
cois group, Federation des femmes de Quebec, from the 
National Action Committee which was prepared to endorse 
a Charter which protected women's rights. Twenty wo-
men's groups presented the results of their deliberations to 
the Joint House-Senate Committee on the Constitution, 
sitting between October, 1980, and February, 1981. Their 
briefs were remarkably similar, and their demands included 
replacing the words "every one" with "every person" 
throughout the Charter; equality for women under the 
law as well as before it; proportional representation for 
woman and men on the Supreme Court; and equal rights 
for native women. 
On January 12,1981, Jean Chretien, then Justice Minis-
ter, announced revisions to the 1980 Constitution Bill. 
Included in the revisions were some of the reforms pro-
posed by women's groups in their briefs. Most significant 
was the agreement to make women and men equal both 
before and under the law. This new wording meant that 
legislation must in its nature by nondiscriminatory, as 
opposed to the earlier Bill of Rights dictum that laws must 
simply be applied equally to women and men, but could 
in their substance treat women and men unequally. But 
other proposals were not adopted. The wording "every 
one" was not replaced by "every person," probably 
because this would anger the pro-choice groups which 
held out the hope that "every one" might be interpreted by 
the courts to include unborn fetuses. Nor was any provi-
sion made for women's proportional representation in the 
courts, where the true test of the equality rights provisions 
would come. And the refusal to grant equal rights specifi-
cally to native women probably reflected the fact that the 
government was negotiating with native people as well as 
with women, and feared jeopardizing a settlement on 
native rights. 
On January 20, shortly after these revisions to the 1980 
Constitution Bill were made public, Doris Anderson 
resigned from the Advisory Council because the Council 
refused to hold the conference planned for February 14. In 
the Council's view, the government had made important 
concessions to women and the conference might harm the 
constitutional process. In the government's view, the con-
ference was no longer necessary. The decision by the Advi-
sory Council to cancel for the second time a conference on 
the Constitution gave rise to a new relationship between 
itself and women's groups, and uneasy partnership which 
still exists today. It also generated a second leadership 
vacuum on the Constitution issue which groups like the 
National Action Committee still were unable or unwil-
ling to fill. In the vacuum, a group of organizers based in 
Toronto and Ottawa came together to give new life to the 
cancelled conference. A new group with about 30 members 
which became known as the Ad Hoc Committee was 
formed. With the co-operation of some women Members 
of Parliament and civil servants,the women of the Ad Hoc 
Committee organized the February 14 conference origi-
nally planned by the Advisory Council. 
The Ad Hoc Committee was not completely on its own. 
Many of the women involved were members of existing 
women's groups. The ties with the National Action 
Committee were particularly strong. This meant that the 
Ad Hoc Committee could use the network established by 
the National Actictures. They focus on educating their member-
ship about important political issues, and on developing a 
consensus among women on the question of women's 
rights. Their concern for the process of decision-making 
sometimes keeps them from responding quickly to govern-
ment initiatives. In the case of the Charter, NAC was 
hampered by membership disagreements about the use-
fulness of a Charter in any form. The Ad a resolution 
against unilateral federal action.16 Yet there is evidence 
that the Charter itself was not liked, even by some of the 
Conference organizers. One member later reflected that: 
Everyone in NAC and other women's groups was 
fairly explicit that we thought the Charter was 
inept, that the process was inadequate, but unless we 
did something with what was on the table we had no 
chance of getting anything at all. 17 
In other words, the Ad Hoc Committee decided to work 
within the limits to action which had been set by the 
federal government. That involved adopting the liberal 
equal opportunity model of rights contained in the Char-
ter. It also involved rejecting any commitment to develop-
ing a consensus among women on the issue of a Charter of 
Rights. 
The list of proposed amendments generated on the first 
day of the Conference was a reiteration of many of the 
proposals submitted by women's groups to the Joint 
House-Senate Committee on the Constitution, and not 
included in the revised Constitution Bill announced in 
January. In addition, the Conference called for '"a state-
ment of purpose' guaranteeing the rights in the Charter 
equally to men and women, with no limitations."18 This 
was the resolution which later became Section 28 of the 
Charter. There was a call for women's right to reproduc-
tive freedom, an end to discrimination on the basis of 
marital status, sexual orientation, or political belief, and 
the application of affirmative action programs to groups 
only, and not to individuals. The women at the Ad Hoc 
Conference also endorsed the concern for process which 
has been so important in the women's movement, calling 
for debate without closure in Parliament on the Constitu-
tion, and meaningful representation of women in the 
deliberations. This concern for representation was reflected 
as well in discussion about the role of the Canadian Advi-
sory Council on the Status of Women. The women at the 
Conference concluded that the Council should report to 
Parliament directly rather than to the Minister Responsi-
ble for the Status of Women. They also proposed that the 
Advisory Council membership should be representative of 
those women in Canada who work for status of women 
issues. Thus, while the women at the Conference were 
committed to working with the document before them, 
they generated a set of goals which in some cases went 
beyond the liberal guarantee of equal opportunity. They 
wanted to see women gain more visibility in the policy-
making process, and to rewrite portions fo the Charter in 
terms of collective rather than individual rights. 
Following the Conference, an administrative assistant 
to one of the women Members of Parliament who was 
lending her support to the process approached some of the 
Ad Hoc Committee members and pointed out that the 
Conference was just the beginning of the struggle. Subse-
quently, in the second stage of the lobbying process a 
smaller group of women who had been part of the original 
Ad Hoc Committee set out to convince the Liberal 
government that the February 14 conference recommenda-
tions be accepted. In order to demonstrate its mandate to 
the government, the committee mailed literature on the 
issue to women across the country, asking for support. It 
was a person-to-person appeal, in which contacts were 
used and friends were urged to help. At the same time, the 
committee worked with women from the National Asso-
ciation of Women and the Law, who negotiated with the 
government for a shorter list of changes. The two groups 
decided to focus primarily on the resolution from the 
February 14 Conference calling for a general statement of 
equality rights for women and men, in the belief that this 
resolution was the most likely to succeed. 
The strategy worked, and Section 28 was included in the 
Constitution. However, when Prime Minister Trudeau 
took this Constitution to the Premiers for ratification in 
November, 1981, he bargained away the "notwithstand-
ing" clause in Section 28 in return for their agreement on 
the rest of the package. In the terms of the November, 1981, 
Accord, Section 28 was made subject to provincial over-
ride. There is convincing evidence that the Premiers' deci-
sion was based on a legal rather that a substantive objec-
tion to Section 28. Saskatchewan Premier Allen Blakeney 
felt that the wording, "Notwithstanding anything in this 
Charter," would make it impossible to enact affirmative 
action programs which favoured women unequally.19 
And so Blakeney, with some of his provincial colleagues, 
wanted the power to override the "Notwithstanding" 
clause. 
Following the November Accord the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee entered the third stage in the lobbying process. The 
Committee was convinced that the Premiers had misin-
terpreted the legal implications of Section 28. For the first 
time in the lobbying process the Committee was sup-
ported by the federal government and the new Minister 
Responsible for the Status of Women, Judy Erola, who 
agreed with its legal interpretation of Section 28. The 
central role of the Minister in this stage of the lobby 
process soon became apparent. The Minister, together 
with Status of Women Canada, can be very useful for both 
information sharing and resource gathering when the 
government and a group share similar goals. In this case, 
Judy Erola was angered by the Prime Minister's decision 
to give in to the Premiers' reading of Section 28, and she 
served notice on her Cabinet colleagues that she would 
change the November Accord.20 She was a useful ally for 
the Ad Hoc Committee. 
The federal-provincial dimension of the Charter nego-
tiations led the Ad Hoc Committee to develop yet another 
set of skills. The problems of working in a federal struc-
ture have plagued women's groups since the turn of the 
century. In the federal-provincial forum of this stage in the 
constitutional talks, the Ad hoc Committee decided to 
concentrate on pressure tactics. The Committee members 
contacted friends who could put pressure on the provin-
cial Premiers, to secure their agreement to remove the 
gender equality clause from the override provisions in the 
Charter. One Ad Hoc Committee member described the 
process this way: "In every case people were thinking, who 
do I know? It was the first time I'd ever seen women think, 
where can we reach out and pull a lever of power?"21 Once 
again the Ad Hoc Committee was successful, and Section 
28 was removed from the provincial override provisions of 
the final version of the Charter. 
The Limits of the Success 
The Ad Hoc Committee mounted a successful pressure 
lobby first to strengthen the federal government's com-
mitment to gender equality and later to convince the 
provincial governments to accept the argument that Sec-
tion 28 would enhance women's legal equality rights. But 
the Committee's success was contained within the limits 
of legal equality rights for women and men. 
In an American study of women's groups, Ann Costain 
notes that three factors contribute to lobbying success. 
They are: 
(1) an external stimulus to break down membership 
resistance to lobbying; (2) the availability of primary 
and secondary groups which are willing to develop 
lobbying; and (3) a minority of Congress members 
willing to provide direction for early lobbying 
efforts.22 
A fourth factor is the perceived legitimacy of the group's 
goals. Legitimate goals are those which the government 
accepts as normal or appropriate. In 1981 the notion of 
legal equality rights for women was acceptable to the 
federal government, even before the Ad Hoc Committee 
launched its campaign. 
Earlier, in 1978, the federal government already had 
accepted the principle of non-discriminatory rights for 
women in the Charter. Women's groups, through their 
submissions to the Joint House-Senate Committee on the 
Constitution in 1981 persuaded the federal government to 
rewrite the non-discriminatory provisions in the Charter 
as equality rights guarantees, and to specify that equality 
would prevail both within laws and in their application. 
The Ad Hoc Committee took the principle of equality 
rights for women one step further, and demanded a special 
guarantee in what became Section 28 that all rights pro-
tected by the Charter would apply equally to male and 
female persons. Subsequently the Ad Hoc Committee 
convinced the provincial governments to accept its inter-
pretation of the legal significance of Section 28. In other 
words, women's groups, including the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee, successfully challenged the sincerity of the federal 
government's commitment to equality rights for women 
by demanding and obtaining what they felt was an iron-
clad guarantee of these rights. But the victory occurred 
within the government's existing policy of legal equality 
rights for women. 
Since 1970, the federal government has been working 
within this policy. In 1972, the principle of equal rights 
was made clear in a memorandum from Prime Minister 
Trudeau to his federal cabinet. He included equal oppor-
tunities for women among his government's goals and 
proposed that women should be integrated "into the 
development process as equal partners with men."25 In 
other words, women were to be granted the right to equal 
opportunity to compete with men for employment in the 
public sphere. In 1979 the federal government set up an 
Affirmative Action Directorate to encourage employers to 
participate in a voluntary program of affirmative action 
for the hiring of women in jobs traditionally held by men. 
While the program was not very successful, it nevertheless 
demonstrated the government's commitment to the prin-
ciple of equal opportunity for women in the labour force. 
A national industrial training program was put in place to 
prepare some women for non-traditional jobs. In 1977, the 
government even went beyond the principle of equal 
opportunity to legislate, in a limited way, equal rewards 
with the passage of the Canadian Human Rights Act. 
This Act established the principle of equal pay for work of 
equal value in the federal public service. 
So, on the issue of equality rights in the Charter the Ad 
Hoc Committee was working with a friendly government. 
But what of the other goals endorsed by women's groups 
and by the women at the February 14 Conference on the 
Constitution? On some issues, like equality rights for 
native women and women's right to reproductive free-
dom, there was no movement by the federal government 
because these were politically sensitive areas. On the ques-
tion of collective rights for woman, such as equal repres-
entation on the Supreme Court or the rewording of clause 
15(2) of the Charter toexclude "individuals" from affirma-
tive action programs, there was no concession because 
these proposals challenged the government's belief that 
individual, and not collective, rights form the basis of a 
free and just society. 
In summary, the Ad Hoc Committee succeeded in con-
vincing the federal government to reaffirm its commit-
ment to equality rights for women, and to raise this issue 
from low to higher priority status. The Committee did not 
have to argue for the principle of equality perse. On other 
issues, particularly those of a redistributive nature such as 
pensions and day-care, the demands of the groups which 
are part of the Canadian women's movement go well 
beyond the federal government's commitment to legal 
equality. 
Nevertheless, the Ad Hoc Committee did make signifi-
cant advances within the government-defined limits of 
action. It convinced the federal and provincial govern-
ments to incorporate women's perspectives on equal 
rights in the wording of the Charter. Costain's three fac-
tors were at work here. First, the perceived failure of the 
federal government to uphold the democratic tradition 
which women's groups have always revered served as a 
strong stimulus to action. The cancellation by the Advi-
sory Council of the February 14 Conference on women 
and the Constitution angered many women who had had 
great faith in the federal government's willingness to 
listen. It led the women who organized the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee to work around the regional differences in the 
women's movement on the issue of an entrenched Charter. 
Secondly, it was a new group, the Ad Hoc Committee, 
which formed to launch a protest. The Ad Hoc Committee 
was small, imbued with a sense of importance, and work-
ing under the pressure of time. It was prepared to adopt 
pressure tactics in the interest of winning equality rights 
for women. The older institutionalized groups like the 
National Action Committee were themselves unwilling or 
unable to become more aggressive but they did provide 
support to the new Ad Hoc Committee. The Ad Hoc 
Committee developed a set of lobbying skills which 
reflected a decision to work partly according to the rules of 
power politics. It gave up some of the consultative practi-
ces of women's groups, ignored the signs of discontent 
from Quebecois feminists, silenced Western dissent, and 
set the agenda for the Conference discussion on February 
14. A network of personal contacts with government was 
established and the pressure on government was main-
tained over time. 
Thirdly, there was support from members of the House 
of Commons at all stages in the lobby process. In the 
period preceding the February 14 Conference, several 
women legislators and their staff gave the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee moral support, physical office-space, and strategic 
advice. In the third and most difficult stage of the lobby, 
convincing the provincial Premiers to exempt Section 28 
from provincial override, the newly-appointed Minister 
Responsible for the Status of Women, the Honorable Judy 
Erola, helped the Ad Hoc Committee. Indeed, the Minister 
found a useful ally in the Committee in her campaign to 
secure strong legal equality rights for women. 
The lobbying gains, if not the equality rights them-
selves, were short-lived. Many of the political contacts 
established by the Ad Hoc Committee during the Charter 
negotiations broke down after the Constitution was pro-
claimed in 1982. Most of the women who were actively 
involved in the Ad Hoc Committee used all of their avail-
able energy on this one issue. In some cases, the women 
were between jobs, in others they were forced to quit their 
employment to work on the Charter. Family and job 
commitments were pushed aside in the short-term, often at 
considerable personal cost. The Ad Hoc Committee could 
not sustain the political contacts established in 1981, and 
several years later women still do not have access to the 
power-holders in government. 
Thus, the barriers for women on issues which go 
beyond legal equality rights were not broken down in 
1981. Even on the legal rights issue which formed the basis 
of the Charter lobby, the Ad Hoc Committee engaged in 
lobbying strategies borrowed from traditional male-domi-
nated interest groups. Since they developed in the 1970's, 
second-wave feminist groups have expressed a commit-
ment to redefining power—from exercising influence over 
others to working with others. Many feminist groups have 
tried to operate consensually, stressing democratic practi-
ces within their organizations and the building of support 
for their positions among all interested women. Members 
of the Ad Hoc Committee, reflecting on their success, 
noted instances when the consensual model had been 
abandoned. The decision to focus energies on winning 
Section 28 was taken by a small group within the Commit-
tee, without the sanction of the women present at the 
February 14 Conference. Indeed, the rapid passage of 
events made it impossible for the committee to seek ratifi-
cation. And while Section 28 may prove to be a victory for 
all Canadian women, in 1981 there were regional groups 
of women who felt that any entrenched Charter was 
against their best interests. 
The Charter was an equal rights issue, and therefore less 
likely to provoke controversy than moral issues like abor-
tion, or redistributive issues like pensions for housewives 
or daycare. Indeed, at the time there was widespread sen-
timent that the Charter was "not an issue, but a statement 
about a country."24 The inability of women's groups to 
develop consensus on this kind of issue, or to implement 
new forms of pressure tactics consistent with feminist 
goals raises questions about future developments within 
the women's movement. 
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The Problem of Evil 
for George Melnyk 
i 
That instrumental moment when 
an off-duty soldier stepped on one of 
Mr. Blake's flowers 
and a cosmos unfolded itself 
with grace and smoke 
inside the seams of a poet's spying brain 
a fissure erupts in flames 
II 
What baby replaces me with scrawny poems 
when I will be too dead to remember? 
My mother pretended we would never know 
the difference, then, she meant the lust 
after fame, or being overly concerned 
with immortality 
and afraid of ashes, thumbprints 
smudged onto foreheads 
III 
It meant house arrest for Galileo 1 hear 
(heresy is a naughty word in this world too) 
Copernicus was wily enough to wait 
he prevaricated until, on his deathbed 
he ordered his findings published 
Anne Richard Burke 
Alberta 
